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THE work bearing the above title is an
octavo volume, consisting of twenty-eight
chapters, and five hundred and sixty pages.
This is no great amount of print ; but the
amount of matter contained in it is prodigious,
and the quality of that matter such as to
require a full stretch of attention. Mr Mill
gives his readers no superfluous sentences,
scarcely even a superfluous word, above what
is necessary to express his meaning briefly and
clearly. Of such a book no complete abstract
can be given in the space to which we are
confined.2 The Philosophy of
To students of philosophy doubtless but
a minority among the general circle of
English readers this work comes recom
mended by the strongest claims both of
interest and instruction. It presents in direct
antithesis two most conspicuous representa
tives of the modern speculative mind of
England Sir &quot;W. Hamilton and Mr John
Stuart Mill.
Sir W. Hamilton has exercised powerful
influence over the stream of thought during
the present generation. The lectures on
Logic and Metaphysics delivered by him
at Edinburgh, for twenty years, determined
the view taken of those subjects by a large
number of aspiring young students, and
determined that view for many of them
permanently and irrevocably.* Several emi-
* Mr Mansel and Mr Veitch, the editors of Sir &quot;W.
Hamilton s Lectures on Metaphysics, posthumously
published, say in their preface (p. xiii.)
For twenty years from 1836 to 1856 the courses
of logic and metaphysics were the means through whichSir W. Hamilton. 3
nent teachers and writers of the present
day are proud of considering themselves his
disciples, enunciate his doctrines in greater
or less proportion, and seldom contradict him
without letting it be seen that they depart
unwillingly from such a leader. Various
Sir William Hamilton sought to discipline and imbue
with his philosophical opinions the numerous youth who
gathered from Scotland and other countries to his class
room
; and while, by these prelections, the author sup
plemented, developed, and moulded the national philo
sophy, leaving thereon the ineffaceable impress of his
genius and learning, he, at the same time and by the
same means, exercised over the intellects and feelings of
his pupils an influence which, for depth, feeling, and
elevation, was certainly never surpassed by that of any
philosophical instructor. Among his pupils there are not
a few who, having lived for a season under the constrain
ing power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on
those great questions regarding the character, origin, and
bounds ofhuman knowledge, which his teaching stirred and
quickened, bear the memory of their beloved and revered
instructor inseparably blended with what is highest in
their present intellectual life, as well as in their practical
aims and aspirations.4 The Philosophy of
new phrases and psychological illustrations
have obtained footing in treatises of philo
sophy, chiefly from his authority. We do
not number ourselves among his followers
;
but we think his influence on philosophy was
in many ways beneficial. He kept up the
idea of philosophy as a subject to be studied
from its own points of view : a dignity which
in earlier times it enjoyed, perhaps, to mis
chievous excess, but from which in recent
times it has far too much receded especially
in England. He performed the great service
of labouring strenuously to piece together the
past traditions of philosophy, to re-discover
those which had been allowed to drop into
oblivion, and to make out the genealogy of
opinions as far as negligent predecessors had
still left the possibility of doing so.
The forty-six lectures on Metaphysics, and
the thirty-five lectures on Logic, published
by Messrs Mansel and Yeitch, constitute the
biennial course actually delivered by Sir W.Sir W, Hamilton. 5
Hamilton in the Professorial Chair. They
ought therefore to be looked at chiefly with
reference to the minds of youthful hearers, as
preservatives against that mischief forcibly
described by Rousseau L inhabitude de
penser dans la jeunesse en ote la capacite pen
dant le reste de la vie.
Now, in a subject so abstract, obscure,
and generally unpalatable, as Logic and
Metaphysics, the difficulty which the teacher
finds in inspiring interest is extreme. That
Sir W. Hamilton overcame such difficulty
with remarkable success, is the affirmation of
his two editors ; and our impression, as
readers of his lectures, disposes us to credit
them. That Sir &quot;W. Hamilton should have
done this effectively is in itself sufficient to
stamp him as a meritorious professor as a
worthy successor to the chair of Dugald
Stewart, whose unrivalled perfection in that
department is attested by every one. Many
a man who ultimately adopted speculative6 The Philosophy of
opinions opposed to Dugald Stewart, received
his first impulse and guidance in the path of
speculation from the lasting impression made
by Stewart s lectures.
But though we look at these lectures, as
they ought to be looked at, chiefly with a
view to the special purpose for which they
were destined, we are far from insinuating
thnt they have no other merits, or that they
are useless for readers who have already a
metaphysical creed of their own. &quot;We have
found them both instructive and interesting : o
they go over a large proportion of the field of
speculative philosophy, partly from the point
of view (not always the same) belonging to
the author, partly from that of numerous
predecessors whom he cites. We recognize
also in Sir &quot;W. Hamilton an amount of
intellectual independence which seldom ac
companies such vast erudition. He recites
many different opinions, but he judges themSir W. Hamilton. 7
all for himself ; and, what is of still greater
moment, he constantly gives the reasons for
his judgments. To us these reasons are
always of more or less value, whether we
admit them to be valid or not. Many philo
sophers present their own doctrine as if it
were so much ascertained and acknowledged
truth, either intimating, or leading you to
suppose, that though erroneous beliefs to the
contrary formerly prevailed, these have now
become discredited with every one. We do
not censure this way of proceeding, but we
prefer the manner of Sir &quot;W. Hamilton. He
always keeps before us divergence and dis
crepancy of view as the normal condition of
reasoned truth or philosophy ; the character
istic postulate of which is, that every affirma
tive and every negative shall have its appro
priate reasons clearly and fully enunciated.
In this point of view the appendix annexed
to the lectures is also valuable
; and the four
copious appendixes or dissertations following8 The Philosophy of
the edition of Reid s works, are more valuable
still. How far Sir W. Hamilton has there
furnished good proof of his own doctrines on
External Perception, and on the Primary
Qualities of Matter, we shall not now deter
mine
; but to those who dissent from him, as
well as to those who agree with him, his
reasonings on these subjects are highly in
structive : while the full citations from so
many other writers contribute materially not
only to elucidate the points directly approached,
but also to enlarge our knowledge of philo
sophy generally. We set particular value
upon this preservation of the traditions of
philosophy, and upon this maintenance of a
known perpetual succession among the specu
lative minds of humanity, with proper com
parisons and contrasts. &quot;We have found
among the names quoted by Sir W. Hamilton,
and, thanks to his care, several authors hardly
at all known to us, and opinions cited from
them not less instructive than curious. HeSir W. Hamilton. 9
deserves the more gratitude, because he
/ departs herein from received usage since
Bacon and Descartes. The example set by
these great men was admirable, so far as it
went to throw off the authority of predecess
ors
; but pernicious so far as it banished those
predecessors out of knowledge, like mere
magazines of immaturity and error. Through
out the eighteenth century, all study of the
earlier modes of philosophizing was, for the
most part, neglected. Of such neglect, re
markable instances are pointed out by Sir &quot;W.
Hamilton.
While speaking about the general merits
and philosophical position of Sir &quot;William
Hamilton, we have hitherto said nothing
about those of Mr Mill. But before we pro
ceed to analyze the separate chapters of his
volume, we must devote a few words to the
fulfilment of another obligation.
Mr John Stuart Mill has not been the first
to bestow honour on the surname which he10 The Philosophy of
bears. His father, Mr James Mill, had
already ennobled the name. An ampler title
to distinction in history and philosophy can
seldom be produced than that which Mr James
Mill left behind him. We know no work
which surpasses his History of British India
in the main excellencies attainable by histori
cal writers : industrious accumulation, con
tinued for many years, of original authorities
careful and conscientious criticism of their
statements and a large command of psycho
logical analysis, enabling the author to inter
pret phenomena of society, both extremely
complicated, and far removed from his own
personal experience. Again, Mr James Mill s
Elements of Political Economy were, at the
time when they appeared, the most logical and
condensed exposition of the entire science then
existing. Lastly, his latest avowed produc
tion, the Analysis of the Phenomena of the
Human Mind/ is a model of perspicuous expo
sition of complex states of consciousness,Sir W. Hamilton. 1 1
carried farther than by any other author
before him ; and illustrating the fulness which
such exposition may be made to attain, by one
who has faith in the comprehensive principle
of association, and has learnt the secret of
tracing out its innumerable windings. It is,
moreover, the first work in which the great
fact of Indissoluble Association is brought into
its due theoretical prominence. These are
high merits, of which lasting evidence is
before the public ; but there were other merits
in Mr James Mill, less publicly authenticated,
yet not less real. His unpremeditated oral
exposition was hardly less effective than his
prepared work with the pen ; his colloquial
fertility on philosophical subjects, his power of
discussing himself, and of stimulating others
to discuss, his ready responsive inspirations
through all the shifts and windings of a sort
of Platonic dialogue all these accomplish
ments were, to those who knew him, even
more impressive than what he composed for12 The Philosophy of
the press. Conversation with him was not
merely instructive, but provocative to the dor
mant intelligence. Of all persons whom we
have known, Mr James Mill was one who
stood least remote from the lofty Platonic ideal
of Dialectic Tou 8t8oVat /cat Se^eo-flai Xoyov
(the giving and receiving of reasons) com
petent alike to examine others, or to be
examined by them, on philosophy. When
to this we add a strenuous character, earnest
convictions, and single-minded devotion to
truth, with an utter disdain of mere paradox
it may be conceived that such a man exer
cised powerful intellectual ascendancy over
younger minds. Several of those who en
joyed his society men now at, or past,
the maturity of life, and some of them in
distinguished positions remember and attest
with gratitude such ascendancy in their own
cases : among them the writer of the present
article, who owes to the historian of British
India an amount of intellectual stimulusSir W. Hamilton. 13
and guidance such as he can never forget.
When a father, such as we have described,
declining to send his. son either to school or
college, constituted himself schoolmaster from
the beginning, and performed that duty with
laborious solicitude when, besides full infu
sion of modern knowledge, the forcing process
applied by the Platonic Socrates to the youth-
Theactetus, was administered by Mr James
Mill, continuously and from an earlier age, to
a youthful mind not less pregnant than that of
Thecctetus it would be surprising if the son
thus trained had not reached even a higher
eminence than his father. The fruit borne by
Mr John Stuart Mill has been worthy of the
culture bestowed, and the volume before us is
at once his latest and his ripest product.
The Examination of Sir William Hamil
ton s Philosophy is intended by Mr Mill (so
he tells us in the preface to the sixth published
edition of his System of Logic, Ratiocinative
and Inductive
) as a sequel and complementH The Philosophy of
to that system. &quot;We are happy to welcome
so valuable an addition
; but with or without
that addition, the System of Logic appears
to us to present the most important advance
in speculative theory which the present century
has witnessed. Either half of it, the Eatio-
cinative or the Inductive, would have surpassed
any previous work on the same subject. The
Inductive half discriminates and brings into
clear view, for the first time, those virtues of
method which have insensibly grown into
habits among consummate scientific inquirers
of the post-Baconian age, as well as the falla
cies by which some of these authors have been
misled. The Eatiocinative half, dealing with
matters which had already been well handled
by Dutrieu and other scholastic logicians,
invests their dead though precise formalism
with a real life and application to the actual
process of finding and proving truth. But
besides thus working each half up to perfec
tion, Mr Mill has performed the still moreSir W. Hamilton. 15
difficult task of overcoming the repugnance,
apparently an inveterate repugnance, between,
them, so as chemically to combine the two
into one homogeneous compound ; thus pre
senting the problem of Reasoned Truth,
Inference, Proof, and Disproof, as one con
nected whole. For ourselves, we still recollect
the mist which was cleared from our minds
when we first read the System of Logic/
very soon after it was published. We
were familiar with the Syllogistic Logic in
Burgersdicius and Dutrieu
; we were also
familiar with examples of the best procedure
in modern inductive science
; but the two
streams flowed altogether apart in our minds,
like two parallel lines never joining nor
approaching. The irreconcilability of the
two was at once removed, when we had read
and mastered the second and third chapters
of the Second Book of the System of Logic ;
in which Mr Mill explains the functions and
value of the Syllogism, and the real import16 The Philosophy of
of its major premiss. This explanation
struck us at the time as one of the most
profound and original efforts of metaphysical
thought that we had ever perused, and we
see no reason to retract that opinion now.*
It appears all the more valuable when we
contrast it with what is said by Mr Mill s
two contemporaries Hamilton and Whately
:
the first of whom retains the ancient theory
of reasoning, as being only a methodized
transition from a whole to its parts, and
from the parts up to the whole Induction
being only this ascending part of the process,
whereby, after having given a complete
enumeration of all the compound parts, you
conclude to the sum total described in one
* TVe are happy to find such high authorities as Dr
&quot;VVhewell, Mr Samuel Bailey, aud Sir John Herschel
concurring in this estimation of the new logical point of
view thus opened by Mr Mill. We will not call it a dis
covery, since Sir John Herschel thinks the expression
unsuitable. See the recent sixth edition of the System
of Logic, vol. i. p. 229.Sir W. Hamilton. 17
word as a whole ;* while the second (&quot;Whately)
agrees in subordinating Induction to Syllo-
* See Sir William Hamilton s Lectures on Logic
(Lect. xvii. p. 320, 321
; also Appendix to those Lectures,
p. 361). He here distinguishes also formal induction from
material induction, which latter he brings under the
grasp of syllogism, by an hypothesis in substance similar
to that of &quot;Whately. There is, however, in Lecture xix.
(p. 380), a passage in a very different spirit, which one
might almost imagine to have been written by Mr Mill :
In regard to simple syllogisms, it was an original
dogma of the Platonic school, and an early dogma of the
Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was only
conversant with, and was exclusively contained in,
universals
; and the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught
that all our general knowledge is only an induction from
an observation of particulars, was too easily forgotten
or perverted by his followers. It thus obtained almost
the force of an acknowledged principle that everything
to be known must be known under some general form or
notion. Hence the exaggerated importance attributed
to definition and deduction ; it not being considered that
we only take out of a general notion what we had
previously placed therein, and that the amplification of
our knowledge is not to be sought for from above but
from below not from speculation about abstract gener
alities, but from the observation of concrete particulars.
Bat however erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had
218 The riiilosopliy of
gism, but does so in a different way by
representing inductive reasoning as a syl
logism, with its major premiss suppressed,
from which major premiss it derived its
authority. The explanation of Mr Mill
attacks the problem from the opposite side.
It subordinates syllogism to induction, the
technical to the real
; it divests the major
premiss of its illusory pretence to be itself
the proving authority, or even any real and
its day and influence, and it perhaps determined, as one
of its effects, the total neglect of one half, and that not
the least important half of the reasoning process.
These very just observations are suggested to Sir
William Hamilton by a train of thought which has little
natural tendency to suggest them, viz., by the distinction
upon which he so much insists, between the logic of
comprehension and the logic of extension, and by his
anxiety to explain why the former had been exclusively
cultivated and the latter neglected.
That which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the
doctrine of Aristotle (enunciated especially at the close
of the Analyt. Post.), and which he states to have been
forgotten by Aristotle s followers, was not always re
membered by Aristotle himself.Sir W. Hamilton. 19
essential part of the proof and acknowledges
it merely as a valuable precautionary test and
security for avoiding mistake in the process
of proving. Taking Mr Mill s System of
Logic as a whole, it is one of the books by
which we believe ourselves to have most
profited. The principles of it are constantly
present to our mind when engaged in investi
gations of evidence, whether scientific or
historical.
Concerned as we are here with Mr Mill
only as a logician and philosopher, we feel
precluded from adverting to his works on
other topics even to his Elements of Politi
cal Economy, by which he is probably more
widely known than by anything else. Of the
many obligations which Political Economy
owes to him, one only can be noticed consistent
with the scope of the present article : the
care which he has taken he alone, or at
least, he more explicitly and formally than any
other expositor to set forth the general20 The Philosophy of
position of that science in the aggregate field
of scientific research
; its relation to sociology
as a whole, or to other fractions thereof, how
far derivative or co-ordinate
; what are its
fundamental postulates or hypotheses, with
what limits the logical methods of induction
and deduction are applicable to it, and how
far its conclusions may be relied on as approx
imations to truth. All these points will be
found instructively handled in the Sixth
Book of Mr Mill s System of Logic/ as well
as in his smaller and less known work, Essays
on Some Unsettled Questions in Political
Economy. We find him, while methodizing
and illustrating the data of the special science,
uniformly keeping in view its relation to
philosophy as a whole.
But there is yet another work in which
the interests of philosophy, as a whole, come
into the foreground and become the special
object of vindication in their largest compass
and most vital requirements. We mean MrSir W. Hamilton, 21
Mill s Essay on Liberty/ one half of which
takes for its thesis the libertas philosophandi.
He maintains, emphatically, in this book,
the full dignity of reasoned truth against all
the jealous exigencies of traditional dogma
and self-justifying sentiment. He claims the
most unreserved liberty of utterance for
negative and affirmative on all questions
not merely for the purpose of discriminating
truth from falsehood, but also to keep up in
individual minds the full sense and under
standing of the matters controverted, in place
of a mere partial and one-sided adhesion. At
first sight, indeed, it might seem as if
Mr Mill was fighting with a shadow
; for
liberty of philosophizing is a postulate which,
in general terms, every one concedes. But
when you come to fathom the real feelings
which underlie this concession, you discover
that almost every man makes it under re
serves which, though acting in silence, are
not the less efficacious. Every one has some22 The Philosophy of
dogmas which he cannot bear to hear advo
cated, and others which he will not allow to
be controverted in his presence. A writer
has to consider not merely by what reasons
any novelty of belief or disbelief may be
justified, but also how much it will be safe
for him to publish, having regard to the
irritable sore places of the public judgment.
In July, 1864, we were present at the annual
meeting of the French Academy at Paris,
where the prizes for essays sent in, pursuant
to subjects announced for study beforehand,
are awarded. We heard the titles of various
compositions announced by the President (M.
Villemain), with a brief critical estimate of
each. Their comparative merits were appre
ciated, and the prize awarded to one of the
competitors. Among the compositions sent to
compete for the prize, one was a work by M.
Taine, upon which the President bestowed the
most remarkable encomiums, in every different
point of view : extent of knowledge, force ofSir W. Hamilton. 23
thought, style, arrangement, all were praised
in a manner which we have rarely heard
exceeded. Nevertheless, the prize was not
awarded to this work, but to another which
the President praised in a manner decidedly
less marked and emphatic. What was here
the ratio decidendi ? The reason was, and the
President declared it in the most explicit
language, that the work of M. Taine was
deeply tainted with materialism, Sans doute,
said the esteemed veteran of French literature
in pronouncing his award, sans doute les
opinions sont libres, mais It is precisely
against this mais ushering in the special
anathematized or consecrated conclusion which
it is intended to except from the general
liberty of enforcing or impugning in matters
of philosophical discussion, that Mr Mill, in
the Essay on Liberty/ declares war as cham
pion of Reasoned Truth.
He handles this grand theme \evdepovs
eiv involving as it does the24 The Philosophy of
best interests of philosophy, as an instructress
to men s judgments, and a stimulus to their
intelligence with great depth of psychological
analysis sustained by abundant historical
illustration. And he in the same volume
discusses most profitably another question akin
to it To what extent, and by what principles,
the interference of others is justifiable, in
restraining the liberty of taste and action
for each individual ? A question at once
grave and neglected, but the discussion of
which does not belong to our present article.
A new work from one who has already
manifested such mastery of philosophy, both
in principle and in detail, and a work exhibit
ing the analysis and appreciation of the
philosophical views of an eminent contem
porary, must raise the highest expectation.
We think no reader will be disappointed who
peruses Mr Mill s Examination, and we shall
now endeavour to give some account of the
manner in which he performs it. Upon topicsSir W. Hamilton. 25
so abstract and subtle as the contents of this
volume, the antithesis between two rival
theories is the best way, and often the only
way, for bringing truth into clear view;
and the Examination here before us is
professedly controversy. But of controversy
in its objectionable sense of captious or
acrimonious personality not a trace will
here be found. A dignified, judicial equa
nimity of tone is preserved from first to last.
Moreover, though the title and direct purpose
of the volume is negative and critical, yet the
destructive criticism is pervaded by many
copious veins of constructive exposition, em
bodying Mr Mill s own views upon some of
the most intricate problems of metaphysics.
Mr Mill begins his work by analyzing




ii. p. 5) which is thought
to belong in the most especial manner to Sir &quot;W.26 The Philosophy of
Hamilton, aud which was the ground of his oppo
sition to the transcendentalism of the later
French and German metaphysicians, is that which
he and others have called the Eelativity of Human
Knowledge. It is the subject of the most gen
erally known and impressive of all his writings
the one which first revealed to the English meta
physical reader that a new power had arisen in
philosophy. Together with its developments, it
composes the Philosophy of the Conditioned,
which he opposed to the French and German
philosophies of the Absolute, and which is re
garded by most of his admirers as the greatest of
his titles to a permanent place in the history of
metaphysical thought. But,
&quot; the relativity of
human knowledge,&quot; like most other phrases into
which the words relative or relation enter, is
vague, and admits of a great variety of mean
ings, &c.
Mr Mill then proceeds to distinguish these
various meanings, and to determine in which
of them the phrase is understood by Sir TV.
Hamilton.
meaning is, that we only know any-Sir W. Hamilton. 27
thing by knowing it as distinguished from
something else that all consciousness is of
difference.&quot;&quot;) It is not, however, in this sense
that the expression is ordinarily or intention
ally used by Sir &quot;W. Hamilton, though he
fully recognizes the truth which, when thus
used, it serves to express. In general, when
he says that all our knowledge is relative,
the relation he has in view is not between the
thing known and other objects compared with.
it/ but between the thing known and the mind
knowing (p. 6). J
The doctrine in this last meaning is held
by different philosophers in two different
forms. Some (e.g. Berkeley, Hume, Ferrier,
&c.), usually called Idealists, maintain not
merely that all we can possibly know of any
thing is the manner in which it affects the
human faculties, but that there is nothing
else to be known
; that affections of human
or of other minds are all that we can know to
exist that the difference between the ego and28 The Philosophy of
the non-ego is only a formal distinction
between two aspects of the same reality.
Other philosophers (Brown, Mr Herbert
Spencer, Auguste Comte, with many others)
believe that the ego and the non-ego denote
two realities, each self-existent, and neither
dependent on the other
; that the Noumenon,
or thing per se, is in itself a different thing
from the Phenomenon, and equally or more
real, but that, though we know its existence,
we have no means of knowing what it is. All
that we can know is, relatively to ourselves,
the modes in which it affects us, or the phe
nomena which it produces (pp. 9 11).
The doctrine of Relativity, as held by
Kant and his many followers, is next distin
guished from the same doctrine as held by
Hartley, James Mill, Professor Bain, &c.,
compatible with either acceptance or rejection
of the Berkeleian theory. Kant maintains
that the attributes which we ascribe to out
ward things, or which are inseparable fromSir W. Hamilton. 29
them in thought, contain additional elements
over and above sensations plus an unknowable
cause additional elements added by the mind
itself, and therefore still only relative, but
constituting the original furniture of the
mind itself inherent laws, partly of our
sensitive, partly of our intellectual faculty.
It is on this latter point that Hartley and
those going along with him diverge. Ad
mitting the same additional elements, these
philosophers do not ascribe to the mind any
innate forms to account for them, but hold
that place, extension, substance, cause, and
the rest, &c., are conceptions put together out
of ideas of sensation, by the known laws of
Association (pp. 12 14).
Partial Relativity is the opinion professed
by most philosophers (and by most persons
who do not philosophize)
. They hold that we
know things partly as they are in themselves,
partly as they are merely in relation to us.
This discrimination of the various schools30 The Philosophy of
of philosophers is highly instructive, and is
given with the full perspicuity belonging to
Mr Mill s style. He proceeds to examine in
what sense Sir &quot;W. Hamilton maintained the
Relativity of Human Knowledge. He cites
passages both from the Discussions on Phi
losophy and from the Lectures, in which
that doctrine is both affirmed in its greatest
amplitude, and enunciated in the most em
phatic language (pp. 17, 18, 22, 23). But
he also produces extracts from the most ela
borate of Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s Dissertations
on Reid/ in which a doctrine quite different
and inconsistent is proclaimed that our know
ledge is only partially, not wholly, relative
;
that the secondary qualities of matter, indeed,
are known to us only relatively, but that the
primary qualities are known to us as they
are in themselves, or as they exist object
ively, and that they may be even evolved
by demonstration a priori (pp. 19 26, 30).
The inconsistency between the two doctrines,Sir W. Hamilton. 31
professed at different times, and in different
works, by Sir &quot;VV. Hamilton, is certainly mani
fest. \Mr Mill is of opinion that one of the
two must be taken in a non-natural sense/
and that Sir &quot;VV. Hamilton either did not
hold, or had ceased to hold, the doctrine of
the full relativity of knowledge (pp. 20 28)
the hypothesis of a flat contradiction being
in his view inadmissible. But we think it at
least equally possible that Sir &quot;VV. Hamilton
held both the two opinions in their natural
sense, and enforced both of them at different
times by argument ; his attention never hav
ing been called to the contradiction between
them. That such forgetfulness was quite
possible, will appear clearly in many parts
of the present article. His argument in sup
port of both is equally characterized by that
peculiar energy of style which is frequent
with him, and which no way resembles the
qualifying refinements of one struggling to
keep clear of a perceived contradiction.32 The Philosophy of
From hence Mr Mill (chap, iv.) proceeds
to criticise at considerable length what he
justly denominates the celebrated and strik
ing review of Cousin s philosophy, which
forms the first paper in Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s
Discussions on Philosophy. According to
Mr Mill
The question really at issue is this : Have
we or have we not an immediate intuition of God ?
The name of God is veiled under two extremely
abstract phrases,
&quot; The Infinite and the Absolute,&quot;
perhaps from a reverential feeling ; such, at least,
is the reason given by Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s disciple,
Mr Mansel, for preferring the more vague expres
sions
; but it is one of the most unquestionable
of all logical maxims, that the meaning of the
abstract must be sought for in the concrete, and
not conversely; and we shall see, both in the
case of Sir &quot;William Hamilton, and of Mr Mansel,
that the process cannot be reversed with impun
ity. p. 32.
Upon this we must remark, that thoughSir W. Hamilton. 33
the logical maxim here laid down by Mr
Mill may be generally sound, we think the
application of it inconvenient in the present
case. Discussions on points of philosophy
are best conducted without either invoking or
offending religious feeling.
fo/L. Cousin main- I
tains that we have a direct intuition of the
Infinite and the Absolute : Sir &quot;W. Hamilton
denies that we have. Upon this point Mr
Mill sides entirely with Sir &quot;W. Hamilton^/
and considers that the latter has rendered
good service to philosophy by refuting M.
Cousin, though much of the reasoning em
ployed in such refutation seems to Mr Mill
unsound. But Sir W. Hamilton goes further,
and affirms that we have no faculties capable
of apprehending the Infinite and the Absolute
that both of them are inconceivable to us,
and by consequence unknowable. Herein Mr
Mill is opposed to him, and controverts his
doctrine in an elaborate argument.
Of this argument, able and ingenious, like34 The Philosophy of
all those in the present volume, our limits
only enable us to give a brief appreciation.
In so far as Mr Mill controverts Sir W.
Hamilton, we think him perfectly successful,
though there are some points in his reasoning
in which we do not fully concur.
In our opinion, as in his, the Absolute
alone (in its sense as opposed to relative) can
be necessarily unknowable, inconceivable, in-
cogitable. Nothing which falls under the
condition of relativity can be declared to be
so. The structure of our minds renders us
capable of knowing everything which is re
lative, though there are many such things
which we have no evidence, nor shall ever
get evidence, to enable us to know. Now
the Infinite falls within the conditions of re
lativity, as indeed Sir &quot;W. Hamilton himself
admits, when he intimates (p. 58) that though
it cannot be known, it is, must be, and ought
to be, believed by us, according to the marked
distinction which he draws between beliefSir W. Hamilton. 35
and knowledge. We agree with Mr Mill in
the opinion that it is thinkable, conceivable,
knowable. Doubtless we do not conceive it
adequately, but we conceive it sufficiently to
discuss and reason upon it intelligibly to our
selves and others. That we conceive the
Infinite inadequately, is not to be held as
proof that we do not conceive it at all; for
in regard to finite things also, we conceive
the greater number of them only inade
quately.
We cannot construe to the imagination a
polygon with an infinite number of sides (i. e.
with a number of sides greater than any
given number), but neither can we construe
to the imagination a polygon with a million
of sides ; nevertheless, we understand what is
meant by the first description as well as by
the second, and can reason upon both. There
is, indeed, this difference between the two :
That the terms used in describing the first,
proclaim at once in their direct meaning that36 The Philosophy of
we should in vain attempt to construe it to
the imagination ; whereas the terms used in
describing the second do not intimate that
fact. We know the fact only by trial, or by
an estimate of our own mental force which
is the result of many past trials. If the
difference here noted were all which Sir ~W.
Hamilton has in view when he declares the
Infinite to be unknowable and incogitable,
we should accede to his opinion ; but we ap
prehend that he means much more, and he
certainly requires more to justify the marked
antithesis in which he places himself against
M. Cousin and Hegel. Indeed, the facility
with which he declares matters to be in-
cogitable, which these two and other philoso
phers not only cogitate but maintain as truth,
is to us truly surprising. The only question
which appears to us important is, whether
we can understand and reason upon the
meaning of the terms and propositions ad
dressed to us. If we can, the subjects pro-Sir W. Hamilton. 37
pounded must be cogitable and conceivable,
whether we admit the propositions affirmed
concerning them or not
; if we cannot, then
these subjects are indeed incogitable by our
selves in the present state of our knowledge,
but they may not be so to our opponent who
employs the terms.
\Jji criticising the arguments of Sir W. \y
Hamilton against M. Cousin, Mr Mill insists
much on a distinction between (1) the In
finite, and (2) the Infinite in any one or
more positive attributes, such as infinite wis
dom, goodness, redness, hardness, &c.* He
thinks that Sir W. Hamilton has made out
his case against the first, but not against
\ r*
the last
; that the first is really an unmean
ing and senseless abstraction, a fasciculus
of negations, unknowable and inconceivable,
but not the lastT) We think that Mr Mill
* The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians.
1. Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid,
sive in certo genere.38 The Philosophy of
makes more of this distinction than the case
warrants
; that the first is not unmeaning,
but an intelligible abstraction, only a higher
reach of abstraction than the last ; that it
is knowable inadequately, in the same way as
the last though more inadequately, because of
its higher abstraction.
As the finite is intelligible, so also is its
negation the Infinite : we do not say (with
M. Cousin) that the two are conjointly given
in consciousness but the two are under
stood and partially apprehended by the mind
conjointly and in contrast. Though the In
finite is doubtless negative as to a degree,
it is not wholly or exclusively negative, since
it includes a necessary reference to some po
sitive attribute, to which the degree belongs ;
the positive element is not eliminated, but
merely left undetermined. The Infinite (like
the Finite, TO Tr^^fpaa-^vov TO cnreipoj;) is a
genus ; it comprehends under it the Infin
itely Hard and the Infinitely Soft, the Infm-Sir W. Hamilton. 39
itely Swift and the Infinitely Slow the infin
ite, in short, of any or all positive attributes.
It includes, doubtless, a farrago of con
tradictions ; but so, also, does the Finite
and so, also, do the actual manifestations
of the real, concrete universe, which mani
festations constitute a portion of the Finite.
Whoever attempts to give any philosophical
account of the generation of the universe,
tracing its phenomena, as an aggregate,
to some ultra-phenomenal origin, must in
clude in his scheme a fnndamentum for all
those opposite and contradictory manifesta
tions which experience discloses in the uni
verse. There always have been, and still are,
many philosophers who consider the Abstract
and General to be prior both in nature and
time to the Concrete and Particular ; and
who hold further that these two last are ex
plained, when presented as determinate and
successive manifestations of the two first,
which they conceive as indeterminate and40 The Philosophy c.f
sempiternal. Now the Infinite (Ens Infini-
tum or Entia Infinita, according to the point
of view in which we look at it) is a generic
word, including all these supposed indeter
minate antecedents; and including therefore,
of course, many contradictory agencies. But
this does not make it senseless or unmean
ing ; nor can we distinguish it from the
Infinite in some one or more given attri
butes/ by any other character than by greater
reach of abstraction. We cannot admit the
marked distinction which Mr Mill contends
for that the one is unknowable and the
other knowable.
It may be proper to add that the mode of
philosophizing which we have just described
is not ours. We do not agree in this way
either of conceiving, or of solving, the pro
blem of philosophy. But it is a mode so
prevalent that Trendelenberg speaks of it,
justly enough, as the ancient Hysteron-
Proteron of Abstraction. The doctrine ofSir W. Hamilton. 41
these philosophers appears to us unfounded,
but we cannot call it unmeaning.
In another point, also, we differ from Mr
Mill respecting that inferior abstraction which
he calls the Infinite in some particular at
tribute. He speaks as if this could be known
not only as an abstraction, a conceivable, an
ideal but also as a concrete reality ; as if
we could know a concrete reality as infinite
or as absolute (p. 45) ; as if there really
existed in actual nature concrete persons
or things possessing infinitely or absolutely
certain specific attributes (pp. 55 93). To
this doctrine we cannot subscribe. As we
understand concrete reality, we find no evi
dence to believe that there exist in nature
any real concrete persons or things, possess
ing to an infinite degree such attributes as
they do possess
: e. g. any men infinitely
wise or infinitely strong, any horses infinitely
swift, any stones infinitely hard. Such con
crete real objects appear to us not admissible,42 The Philosophy of
because experience not only has not certified
their existence in any single case, but goes / O * O
as far to disprove their existence as it can
do to disprove anything. All the real ob
jects in nature known to us by observation
are finite, and possess only in a finite mea
sure their respective attributes. Upon this
is founded the process of Science, so com
prehensively laid out by Mr Mill in his
System of Logic Induction, Deduction
from general facts attested by Induction,
Verification by experience of the results ob
tained by Deduction. The attributes, white
ness or hardness, in the abstract, are doubtless
infinite; that is, the term will designate,
alike and equally, any degree of whiteness or
hardness which you may think of, and any
unknown degree even whiter and harder than
what you think of. But when perceived as
invested in a given mass of snow or granite
before us, they are divested of that indeter-Sir W. Hamilton. 43
minateness, and become restricted to a deter
minate measure and degree.
Having thus indicated the points on which
we are compelled to dissent from Mr Mill s
refutation of Sir &quot;W. Hamilton in the plead
ing against M. Cousin, we shall pass to the
seventh chapter, in which occurs his first
controversy with Mr Mansel. This passage
has excited more interest, and will probably
be remembered by a larger number of readers,
than any portion of the book. We shall
give it in his own words (pp. 99 103), since
the energetic phraseology is quite as remark
able as the thought
:
There is but one way for Mr Mansel out
of this difficulty, and he adopts it. He must
maintain, not merely that an Absolute Being is
unknowable in himself, but that the Relative
attributes of an Absolute Being are unknowable
also.* He must say that we do not know what
* This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is
concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Man-44 The Philosophy of
Wisdom, Justice, Benevolence, Mercy, &c., are,
as they exist in God. Accordingly, he does say
so. &quot;It is a fact&quot; (says Mr Mansel)
&quot; which ex
perience forces upon us, and which it is useless,
were it possible, to disguise, that the representa
tion of God after the model of the highest hu
man morality which we are capable of conceiving,
is not sufficient to account for all the phenomena
exhibited by the course of his natural Providence.
The infliction of physical suffering, the permis
sion of moral evil, the adversity of the good, the
prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty
involving the misery of the innocent, the tardy
appearance and partial distribution of moral and
religious knowledge in the world these are facts,
which no doubt are reconcilable, we know not
how, with the Infinite Goodness of God, but
sel, but also by Pascal, one of the most religious philoso
phers of the seventeenth century, in the Pensees :
Parlons selon les lumieres naturellcs. S il y a un
Dieu, il est infiniment incomprehensible ; puisque, n ayant
ni principes ni homes, il n a nul rapport a nous
; nous
sommes done incapahles de connaitre ni ce qu il est, ni
s il est. (See Arago, Biographic de Condorcet, p. Ixxxiv.,
prefixed to his edition of Condorcet s works.)Sir W. Hamilton. 4&amp;lt;5
which certainly are not to be explained on the
supposition that its sole and sufficient type is to
be found in the finite goodness of man.&quot;
In other words (continues Mr Mill comment
ing) it is necessary to suppose that the infinite
goodness ascribed to God is not the goodness
which we know and love in our fellow-creatures,
distinguished only as infinite in degree ; but is
different in kind, and another quality altogether.
Accordingly Mr Mansel combats as a heresy of
his opponents, the opinion that infinite goodness
differs only in degree from finite goodness. Here,
then, I take my stand upon the acknowledged
principle of logic and of morality ; that when we
mean different things we have no right to call
them by the same name, and to apply to them
the same predicates, moral and intellectual. If,
instead of the glad tidings that there exists a
Being in whom all the excellences which the
highest human form can conceive, exist in a de
gree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the
world is ruled by a being whose attributes are
infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, ex
cept that the highest human morality does not
sanction them convince me of this and I will46 The Philosophy of
bear my fate as I may. But when I am told
that I must believe this, and at the same time
call this being by the names which express and
affirm the highest human morality, I say, in
plain terms, that I will not. Whatever power
such a being may have over me, there is one
thing he shall not do
; he shall not compel me to
worship him. I will call no being good who is
not what I mean when I apply that epithet to
my fellow-creatures ; and if such a being can
sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell
I will go.
This concluding declaration is memorable
in many ways. Mr Mill announces his reso
lution to determine for himself, and according
to his own reason and conscience, what God
he will worship, and what God he Avill not
worship. For ourselves, we cordially sympa
thize with his resolution. But Mr Mill must
be aware that this is a point on which society
is eqiially resolved that no individual shall
determine for himself, if they can help it.*
* The indictment under which Socrates was con-Sir W. Hamilton. 47
Each new-born child finds his religious creed
demned at Athens, as reported by Xenophon at the
commencement of the Memorabilia, rail thus Socrates
is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in
those Gods in whom the City believes, but introduces
other novelties in regard to the Gods
; he is guilty also,
inasmuch as he corrupts the youth.
These words express clearly a sentiment entertained
not merely by the Athenian people, but generally by
other societies also. They all agree in antipathy to
free, individual, dissenting reason ; though that antipathy
manifests itself by acts, more harsh in one place, less
harsh in another. The Hindoo who declares himself a
couvert to Christianity, becomes at the same time an
outcast (dQprjTwp, aQifiiffTog, avianoo) among those whose
Gods he has deserted. As a general fact, the man who dis
sents from his fellows upon fundamentals of religion, pur
chases an undisturbed life only by being content with
that semi-liberty under silence and concealment/ for
which Cicero was thankful under the dictatorship of
Julius Caesar. Obsecro ab
; iciamus ista et semi-
liberi saltern simus ; quod assequemur et tacendo et
latendo (Epist. ad Attic, xiii. 31). Contrast with this
the memorable declaration of Socrates, in the Platonic
Apology, that silence and abstinence from cross-examin
ation were intolerable to him
; that life would not be
worth having under such conditions.48 The Philosophy of
ready prepared for him. In his earliest days
of unconscious infancy, the stamp of the
national, gentile, phratric, God, or Gods, is
imprinted upon him by his elders
; and if the
future man, in the exercise of his own inde
pendent reason, acquires such convictions as
compel him to renounce those Gods, proclaim
ing openly that he does so he must count
upon such treatment as will go far to spoil
the value of the present life to him, even
before he passes to those ulterior liabilities
which Mr Mill indicates in the distance. We
are not surprised that a declaration so unusual
and so impressive should have been often cited
in critical notices of this volume
; that during
the month preceding the last Westminster
election, it was studiously brought forward by
some opponents of Mr Mill, and more or less
regretted by his friends, as likely to offend
many electors, and damage his chance of
success
; and that a conspicuous and noble-
minded ecclesiastic, the Dean of Westminster,Sir W. Hamilton. 49
thought the occasion so grave as to come
forward with his characteristic generosity, for
the purpose of shielding a distinguished man
suspected of heresy.
The sublime self-assertion, addressed by
Prometheus to Zeus, under whose sentence he
was groaning, has never before been put into
such plain English.* Mr Mill s declaration
reminds us also of Hippolytus, the chaste and
pure youth, whose tragic fate is so beautifully
*
JEschyl. Prometh., 990-1006
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Also v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe,
entitled Prometheus, embodies a similar vein of sentiment
in the finest poetry.50 The Philosophy of
described by Euripides. Hippolytus is ex
emplary in his devotions to the Goddess
Artemis
; but he dissents from all his country
men, and determines for himself, in refusing
to bestow the smallest mark of honour or
worship upon Aphrodite, because he considers
her to be a very bad Goddess.* In this
refusal he persists with inflexible principle
(even after having received, from an anxious
attendant, warning of the certain ruin which
it will bring upon him), until the insulted
Aphrodite involves him, along with the un
happy Phaedra and Theseus himself, in one
common abyss of misery. In like manner
*
Euripid. Hippol., 10
(Aph.) 6 yap [it Qrjatws TTO.IQ, ApdZovoQ TOKOQ,
HOVOQ irdXirwv TrjrrSi 7775 Tpoijjvtae
Xsytt KaicitrrTjv datnovwv TTtfyvKtvaC
&amp;lt;boifiov 5 dSi\^&amp;gt;riv &quot;ApTtp.iv,
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See also v. 13281402.Sir W. Hamilton. 51
Mr Mill s declaration stands in marked con
trast with, the more cautious proceeding of
men like Herodotus. That historian, alike
pious and prudent, is quite aware that all the
Gods are envious and mischief-making, and
expressly declares them to be so.* Yet, far
from refusing to worship them on that ac
count, he is assiduous in prayer and sacrifice
perhaps, indeed, all the more assiduous in
consequence of what he believes about their
attributes ;f being persuaded (like the at
tendant who warned Hippolytus) that his
only chance of mollifying their ungentle
dispositions in regard to himself is, by hon
orific tribute in words and offerings.
* Herodot. t. 32. Q
Kpoi&amp;lt;T, iiriaTu^vuv fjf TO Qtiov
irav iuv 00oi/fpor TC Kal rapa-^iUSi^ tTTiipwryg dr9pwTTT)iwv
irpayfidruv irkpi ; also iii. 40.
t See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-] 49. The language of the
attendant, after his affectionate remonstrance to Hip
polytus had been disregarded, supplicating Aphrodite to
pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but obstinate
youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)52 The Philosophy of
When, however, after appreciating as we
are bound to do Mr Mill s declaration of
subjective sentiment, we pass to its logical
bearing on the controversy between him and
Mr Mansel, we are obliged to confess that in
this point of view it has little objective
relevancy. The problem was, how to recon
cile the actual evil and suffering in the
universe (which is recited as a fact by Mr
Mansel, though in terms conveying a most
inadequate idea of its real magnitude) with
the goodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates
the explanatory hypothesis tendered by Mr
Mansel, as a solution, but without suggesting
any better hypothesis of his own. For our
selves, we are far from endorsing Mr Mansel s
solution as satisfactory ; yet we can hardly
be surprised if he considers it less unsatisfac
tory than no solution at all. And when we
reflect how frequently and familiarly predi
cates applicable to man are applied to theSir W. Hamilton. 53
Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be
understood about Him in the same sense we
see no ground for treating the proceeding as
disingenuous, which Mr Mill is disposed to
do. Indeed, it cannot easily be avoided : and
Mr Mill himself furnishes us with some
examples in the present volume. At page
491, he says
:
It would be difficult to find a stronger argu
ment in favour of Theism, than that the eye
must have been made by one who sees, and the
ear by one who hears.
In the words here employed, seeing and
hearing are predicted of God.
Now when we predicate of men, that they
see or hear, we affirm facts of extreme com
plexity, especially in the case of seeing ; facts
partly physical, partly mental, involving
multifarious movements and agencies of
nerves, muscles, and other parts of the organ-54 The Philosophy of
ism, together with direct sensational impres
sions, and mental reconstruction of the past,
inseparably associated therewith
; all which,
so far as they are known, are perspicuously
enumerated in the work of Professor Bain*
on the Senses and the Intellect. Again,
Mr Mill speaks (in p. 102 and elsewhere) of
the veracity of God. When we say of our
neighbour that he is a veracious man, we
ascribe to him a habit of speaking the truth
;
that is, of employing his physical apparatus
of speech, and his mental power of recalling
and recombining words lodged in the memory,
for the purpose of asserting no other propo
sitions except such as declare facts which he
knows, or beliefs which he really entertains.
But how either seeing, or hearing, or veracity,
in these senses, can be predicated of God, we
are at a loss to understand. And if they are
* See especially his chapter
ii. on the Sensations of
Sight, pp. 222, 241247, in the second edition of this
work.Sir W. Hamilton. 55
to be predicated of God in a different sense,
this admits the same license as Mr Mansel
contends for in respect to Goodness, when he
feels that undeniable facts preclude him
from predicating that epithet univocally
respecting God and respecting man.*
On the whole, it seems to us, that though
Mr Mill will consent to worship only a God
of perfect goodness, he has thrown no new
light on the grave problem frankly stated
though imperfectly solved, by Mr Mansel
how such a conception of God is to be recon
ciled with the extent of evil and suffering
actually pervading human life and animal
life throughout the earth. We are compelled
* Descartes says, in his Principia Philosophise,
i. 51 Et quidern substantia quae nulla plane re indigeat,
unica tantura potest intelligi nerape Deus. Alias vero
omnes, non nisi ope concursiis Dei existere posse perspi-
cimus. Atque ideo nomen substantise non convenit Deo
et illis univoce, ut dici solet in scholis ; hoc est, nulla
ejus nominis significatio potest distincte intelligi, quse
Deo et creaturis sit communis.56 The Philosophy of
to say, respecting Mr Mill s treatment of this
subject what we should not say respecting
his treatment of any other that he has left
an old perplexing problem not less perplexing
than he found it.
Reverting, not unwillingly, from theology
to philosophy, we now pass on to Mr Mill s
ninth chapter (p. 128 seq.), of the Interpret
ation of Consciousness. There is assuredly
110 lesson more requiring to be taught than
the proper mode of conducting such inter
pretation ; for the number of different modes
in which Consciousness has been interpreted
is astonishing. Mr Mill begins by citing
from Sir W. Hamilton s lectures a passage of
some length, upon which he bestows con
siderable praise, regarding it as
One of the proofs that, whatever may be
the positive value of his (Sir W. Hamilton s)
achievements in metaphysics, he had a greater
capacity for the subject than many metaphysiciansSir W. Hamilton. 57
of high reputation ; and particularly than his two
distinguished predecessors in the same school of
thought&quot; Eeid and Stewart.&quot; p. 131.
This is one of the greatest compliments
to Sir &quot;W. Hamilton that the book contains,
and as such we are glad to cite it.
On the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill
has cited from Sir TV. Hamilton other good
observations besides the one last alluded to
;
but, unfortunately, these are often neutralized
by opposite or inconsistent opinions also cited
from other parts of his works. The number
of such inconsistencies produced is indeed one
remarkable feature in Sir TV. Hamilton s
philosophical character. He seems to follow
out energetically (as Plato in his various
dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his
mind at each particular moment, without
troubling himself to look back upon his own
prior speculations. Even compared with the
best views of Sir TV. Hamilton, however, Mr58 The Philosophy of
Mill s mode of handling the subject of Con
sciousness exhibits signal improvement. To
some of his observations we shall call parti
cular attention.
All philosophers agree that what Con
sciousness testifies is to be believed
; but they
differ much on the question To what
points Consciousness does testify ? and even
on the still deeper question How shall we
proceed to ascertain what are these attested
points? What is the proper method of
studying or interrogating Consciousness?
Upon this Mr Mill remarks (pp. 145 147)
:
Here emerges the distinction between two
different methods of studying the problems of
metaphysics; forming the radical difference be
tween the two great schools into which meta
physicians are divided. One of these I shall call
for distinction, the introspective method
; the
other, the psychological. M. Cousin observes
that Locke went wrong from the beginning, by
placing before himself, as the question to be firstSir W. Hamilton. 59
resolved, the origin of our ideas. This (he says)
was commencing at the wrong end. The proper
course would have been to begin by determining
what the ideas now are
; to ascertain what it is
that Consciousness now tells us
; postponing till
afterwards the attempt to frame a theory con
cerning the origin of any of the mental phe
nomena.
I accept the question as M. Cousin states
it
; and I contend that no attempt to determine
what are the direct revelations of Consciousness
can be successful, or entitled to any regard, unless
preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to fol
low it an inquiry into the origin of our acquired
ideas. For we have it not in our power to
ascertain, by any direct process, what Conscious
ness told us at the time when its revelations were
in their pristine purity. It only offers itself to
our inspection, as it exists now, when those
original revelations are overlaid and buried under
a mountainous heap of acquired notions and
perceptions.
It seems to M. Cousin, that if we examine
with care and minuteness our present states of
Consciousness, distinguishing and defining every60 The Philosophy of
ingredient which we find to enter into them
every element that we seem to recognize as real,
and cannot by merely concentrating our attention
upon it analyze into anything simpler we reach
the ultimate and primary truths, which are the
sources of all our knowledge, and which cannot
be denied or doubted without denying or doubt
ing the evidence of Consciousness itself that is,
the only evidence that there is for anything. I
maintain this to be a misconception of the con
dition imposed on inquirers by the difficulties of
psychological investigation. To begin the inquiry
at the point where M. Cousin takes it up is, in
fact, to beg the question. For he must be aware,
if not of the fact, at least of the belief of his
opponents, that the laws of the mind the Laws
of Association, according to one class of thinkers,
the Categories of the Understanding, according
to another are capable of creating, out of those
data of Consciousness which are uncontested,
purely mental conceptions, which become so
identified in thought with all our states of Con
sciousness, that we seem, and cannot but seem, to
receive them by direct intuition. For example,
the belief in matter in the opinion of theseSir W. Hamilton. 61
thinkers is, or at least may be, thus produced:
&quot; The proof that any of the alleged Uni
versal Beliefs, or Principles of Common Sense,
are affirmations of Consciousness supposes two
things
: that the beliefs exist, and that they
cannot possibly have been acquired. The first is,
in most cases, undisputed ; but the second is a
subject of inquiry which often taxes the utmost
resources of psychologists. Locke Avas therefore
right in believing that the origin of our ideas
is the main stress of the problem of mental
science, and the subject which must be first
considered ill forming the theory of the Mind.&quot;
This citation from Mr Mill s book is
already almost too long, yet we could have
wished to prolong it still more, from the im
portance of some of the succeeding paragraphs.
It presents, in clear discrimination and con
trast, two opposite points of view accord
ing to which, the phenomena of mind are
regarded by different philosophers, and the
method of studying them determined: the62 The Philosophy of
introspective method, adopted by M. Cousin
and others the psychological or analytical
method, pursued by Locke and by many other
eminent men since Locke the known and
approved method of physical science, adapted
to the necessities of psychology (p. 148).
There are passages of Sir W. Hamilton s
writings in which he appears to feel that the
introspective method alone is insufficient for
the interpretation of Consciousness, and that
the analytical method must be employed to
reinforce it. But on this as on other points
he is not always consistent with himself. For
in laying down the principle upon which the
primary truths of Consciousness, the original
data of intelligence, are to be ascertained
and distinguished from generalizations out of
experience and custom, he declares that the
one single and certain mark is Necessity
they must be beliefs which we are under the
necessity of believing of which we cannot
get rid by any mental effort. He decidesSir W. Hamilton. 63
this, of course, for himself, by the introspective
method alone. He (with M. Cousin and
other philosophers who take the same view)
does not apply the analytical method to in
quire whether his necessity of belief may not
be a purely acquired necessity and nowise
congenital. It is, indeed, remarkable that
these philosophers do not even seek to apply
the introspective method as far as that
method will really go. They are satisfied
with introspection of their own present minds
;
without collecting results of the like process
as applied to other minds, in different times
and places. They declare various beliefs to
be necessary to the human mind universally,
merely because such is the actual fact with
their own minds and with those immediately
around them
; sometimes even in defiance of
proof that there are (or have been) persons
not sharing such beliefs, and occasionally even
believing the contrary ; therefore, when even
the introspective method really disallows their64 The Philosophy of
affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is,
in truth, an abuse of the introspective method;
yet even if that method were employed in its
fullest extent if the same incapability of
believing otherwise could be shown as com
mon to all mankind it might still be only
the effect of a strong association. The ana
lytical method must still be called in to
ascertain whether we are forced to suppose
such incapability to be an original fact of
consciousness, or whether it may not have
been generated in the mind by circumstances
under the natural working of the laws of
association. It is certain that these laws not
only may, but must, give birth to artificial
inconceivabilities in the mind and that
some of these may be equal in strength to
such, if any, as are natural.
The History of Science (says Mr Mill, fol
lowing out the same train of reasoning which
we read in the third Book of his System ofSir W. Hamilton. 60
Logic ) teems with inconceivabilities which have
been conquered ; and with supposed necessary
truths, which have first ceased to be thought
necessary, then to be thought true, and have
finally come to be deemed impossible. p. 150.
After various observations, chiefly exhi
biting the rashness of many censures be
stowed by Sir W. Hamilton on Brown, Mr
Mill gives us three valuable chapters (xi.,
xii., xiii.), wherein he analyzes the belief in
an External World, the Belief in Mind as
a separate substance or Noumenon, and the
Primary Qualities of Matter. To each of
these topics he applies what he calls the
psychological method, as contrasted with the
simply introspective method of Sir &quot;W. Ham
ilton (the Ego and Non-Ego affirmed to be
given together in the primary deliverance of
Consciousness) and so many other philoso
phers. He proves that these beliefs are no
way intuitive, but acquired products ; and66 The Philosophy of
that the known laws of Association are suffi
cient to explain how they are acquired ; espe
cially the Law of Inseparable Association,
together with that of Obliciscence a very
useful, discriminating phrase, which we first
find employed in this volume (p. 259 et
passim). He defines Matter to be a perman
ent possibility of Sensation ; he maintains that
this is really all which (apart from philoso
phical theories) mankind in general mean
by it
; he shows that mere possibilities of
sensation not only may, but must, according
to the known Laws of Association, come to
present to our artificialized Consciousness
a character of objectivity (pp. 198, 199).
The correlative subject, though present in
fact and indispensable, is eliminated out of
conscious notice, according to the Law of
Obliviscence.
These chapters will well repay the most
careful perusal. We can only find room for
one passage (pp. 214, 215)
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Throughout the whole of our sensitive life,
except its first beginnings, we unquestionably
refer our sensations to a me and not-me. As soon
as I have formed, on the one hand, the notion
of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, and on
the other, of that continued series of feelings
which I call my life -both these notions are, by
an irresistible association, recalled by every sens
ation I have. They represent two things, with
both of which the sensation of the moment, be
it what it may, stands in relation
; and I cannot
be conscious of the sensation without being con
scious of it as related to these two things. They
have accordingly received relative names, express
ive of the double relation in question. The
thread of consciousness which I apprehend the
relation as a part of, is called the Subject ; the
group of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation to
which I refer it, and which is partially realized
and actualized in it, is called the Object of the
sensation. The sensation itself ought to have a
correlative name, or rather ought to have two
such names one denoting the sensation as op
posed to its Subject, the other denoting it as
opposed to its Object ; but it is a remarkable
fact that this necessity has not been felt, and68 The Philosophy of
that the need of a correlative name to every
relative one has been considered to be satisfied
by the terms Object and Subject themselves. It
is true that these two are related to one another,
but only through the sensation. We have no
conception of either Subject or Object, either
Mind or Matter, except as something to which
we refer our sensations, and whatever other feel
ings we are conscious of. The very existence of
them both, so far as cognizable by us, consists only
in the relation they respectively bear to our states of
feeling. Their relation to each other is only the
relation betweeu those two relations. The im
mediate correlatives are, not the pair, Object,
Subject, but the two pairs, Object, Sensation ob
jectively considered Subject, Sensation subjectively
considered. The reason why this is overlooked
might easily be shown, and would furnish a good
illustration of that important part of the Laws of
Association, which may be termed the Laws of
Obliviscence.
This chapter, on the Primary Qualities
of Matter, controverts the opinion of Sir
W. Hamilton, that extension, as consistingSir W. Hamilton. 69
of co-existent partes extra paries, is immedi
ately and necessarily apprehended by our
consciousness. It cites, as well as confirms,
the copious proof given by Professor Bain
(in his work on the Senses and the Intellect)
that our conception of extension is derived
from our muscular sensibility
: that our sens-
sation of muscular motion unimpeded constitutes
our notion of empty space, as our sensation
of muscular motion impeded constitutes that
of filled space
: that our conception of ex
tension, as an aggregate of co-existent parts,
arises from the sense of sight, which com
prehends a great number of parts in a suc
cession so rapid as to be confounded with
simultaneity and which not only becomes the
symbol of muscular and tactile succession, but
even acquires such ascendancy as to supersede
both of them in our consciousness. Confirm
ation is here given to this important doc
trine, not merely by observations from Mr
Mill himself, but also from the very curious70 The Philosophy of
narrative, discovered and produced by Sir W.
Hamilton, out of a work of the German
philosopher, Platner. , Platner instituted a
careful examination ofa man born blind, and
ascertained that this man did not conceive
extension as an aggregate of simultaneous
parts, but as a series of sensations experi
enced or to be experienced in succession (pp.
232, 233). The case reported from Platner
both corroborates the theory of Professor
Bain, and receives its proper interpretation
from that theory ; while it is altogether ad
verse to the doctrine of Sir &quot;W. Hamilton as
is also another case, which he cites from Maine
de Biran :
.
It gives a very favourable idea of Sir ~VV.
Hamilton s sincerity and devotion to truth (re
marks Mr Mill, p. 247), that he should have drawn
from obscurity, and made generally known, two
cases so unfavourable to his own opinions.
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we would point out besides, in appreciating
Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s merits, that his appetite
for facts was useful to philosophy, as well
as his appetite for speculation. But the per
son whose usefulness to philosophy we prefer
to bring into the foreground, is Platner him
self. He spent three weeks in patient ex
amination of this blind man, and the tenor
of his report proves that his sagacity in in
terpreting facts was equal to his patience
in collecting them. The rarity of all such
careful and premeditated observation of the
facts of mind, appears to us one main reason
why (what Mr Mill calls) the psychological
theory finds so little acceptance ; and why
those who maintain that what now seems a
mental integer was once a multiplicity of
separate mental fragments, can describe the
antecedent steps of the change only as a
latens processes, which the reader never fully
understands, and often will not admit. Every
man s mind is gradually built up from in-72 The Philosophy of
fancy to maturity ; the process is always
going on before our eyes, yet the stages of it
especially the earliest stages, the most preg
nant with instruction are never studied and
put on record by observers trained in induc
tive logic, knowing beforehand what they
ought to look for as the sine qua non for
proving or disproving any proposed theory.
Such cases as that cited by Platner cases
of one marked congenital defect of sense,
enabling us to apply the Method of Differ
ence are always within reach
; but few Plat-
ners are found to scrutinize and record them.
Historians of science describe to us the la
borious and multiplied observations, and the
elaborate precaution for ensuring accuracy of
observation, which recent chemical and phy
sical inquirers have found indispensable for
the establishment of their results. We can
not, therefore, be surprised that mental phi
losophers, dealing with facts even more ob
scure, and careless about enlarging, varying,Sir W. Hamilton. 73
authenticating their records of particular facts,
should have had little success in establishing
any results at all.
But if even those, who adopt the psycho
logical theory, have been remiss in the ob
servation of particular mental facts, those who
deny the theory have been far more than
remiss ; they have been blind to obvious facts
contradicting the principles which they lay
down. Mr Mill, in chap, xiv., deals with this
denial, common to Mr Mansel with Sir &quot;W&quot;.
Hamilton. That philosophers so eminent as
both of them should declare confidently what
I cannot but think must be a priori, or ori
ginal to thought ; it cannot be engendered by
experience upon custom (p. 264) appears to
us as extraordinary as it does to Mr Mill.
Though no one ever surpassed Sir TV. Hamil
ton in large acquaintance with the actual diver
sities of human belief, and human incapacities
of believing yet he never seems to have
thought of bringing this acquaintance into74 The Philosophy of
account, when he assured the students in his
lecture-room, that custom, experience, indis
soluble association, were altogether insufficient
to engender a felt necessity of believing. Such
forgetfulness of well-known mental facts can
not be reproached to the advocates of the
psychological theory.
In chap. xv. Mr Mill examines Sir &quot;W.
Hamilton s doctrine on unconscious mental
modifications. He points out the confused
manner in which Sir &quot;W. Hamilton has con
ceived mental latency, as well as the incon
clusive character of the reasoning whereby
he refutes the following doctrine of Dugald
Stewart That in the most rapid trains of
association, each separate item must have been
successively present to consciousness, though
for a time too short to leave any memory.
Sir W. Hamilton thinks that the separate
items may pass, and often do pass, uncon
sciously ; which opinion Mr Mill also, though
not approving his reasons, is inclined to adopt.Sir W. Hamilton. 75
I am myself inclined (p. 285) to admit un
conscious mental modifications, in the only sense
in which I can attach any very distinct meaning
to them namely, unconscious modifications of
the nerves. It may well be believed that the
apparently suppressed links in a chain of associ
ation, those which Sir &quot;W. Hamilton considers as
latent, really are so : that they are not even
momentarily felt, the chain of causation being
continued only physically by one organic state
of the nerves succeeding another so rapidly, that
the state of mental consciousness appropriate to
each is not produced.
Mr Mill gives various illustrations in sup
port of this doctrine. He at the same time
calls attention to a valuable lecture of Sir W.
Hamilton s, the thirty-second lecture on Meta
physics ; especially to the instructive citation
from Cardaillac contained therein, noting the
important fact, which descriptions of the Law
of Association often keep out of sight that the
suggestive agency of Association is carried
on, not by single antecedents raising up76 The Philosophy of
single consequents, but by a mass of antece
dents raising up simultaneously a mass of
consequents, among which attention is very
unequally distributed.
We shall say little upon Mr Mill s re
marks on Sir W. Hamilton s Theory of Causa
tion (chap. xvi.). This theory appears to
Mr Mill absurd
; while the theory of Mr
Mill (continued from Hume, Brown, and
James Mill) on the same subject, appears to
Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and unsatisfac
tory professing to explain the phenomenon
of causality, but, previously to explanation,
evacuating the phenomenon of all that desider
ates explanation (p. 295). For ourselves
we embrace the theory of Mr Mill :* yet wo
* At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr
Mill in the following affirmation (p. 201)
:
c This natural probability is converted into certainty
when we take into consideration that universal law of
our experience which is termed the Law of Causation,
and which makes us unable to conceive the beginning of
anything without an antecedent condition, or cause.Sir W. Hamilton. 77
are aware that the remark just cited from
Sir &quot;W. Hamilton represents the dissatisfaction
Such inability to conceive appears to us not in
correspondence with facts. First, it cannot be properly
either affirmed or denied, until agreement is obtained
what the word cause means. If three persons, A, B, and
C, agree in affirming it A adopting the meaning of
Aristotle, B that of Sir &quot;William Hamilton, and C that of
Mr Mill the agreement is purely verbal
; or rather, all
three concur in having a mental exigency pressing for
satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satis
fies it.
Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill s theory as to
Cause, certainly those, who deny his theory can have
no difficulty in conceiving events without any cause
(in that sense) : nor have those who adopt this theory
any greater difficulty. These latter lelieve that there
are, throughout, constant and uniform conditions on
which the occurrence of every event depends ; but they
can perfectly conceive events as occurring without any
such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such
causation, as pervading all nature, is an acquired result
of scientific training. The greater part of mankind
believe that some events occur in regular, others in
irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the meta
physical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and
consider that all volitions occur without any cause at all.78 The Philosophy of
entertained towards it by many objectors.
The unscientific and antiscientific yearnings,
prevalent among mankind, lead them to put
questions which no sound theory of Causation
will answer
; and they are ready to visit and
trust any oracle which professes to deliver a
confident affirmative solution of such ques
tions. Among all the terms employed by
metaphysicians, none is used in a greater
variety of meanings than the term Cause.
In Mr Mill s next chapter (xvi.) he com
ments on Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s doctrine of Con
cepts or General Notions. There are portions
of this chapter with which we agree less than
with most other parts of the volume
; especially
with his marked hostility to the term Con
cept, and the reasons given for it, which
reasons appear to us not very consistent with
what he has himself said in the System of
Logic, Book IY. chap.
ii. 1 3. The term
Concept has no necessary connection with the
theory called Conceptualism. It is equallySir IV. Hamilton. 79
available to designate the idea called up by
a general name, as understood either by Mr
Bailey or by James Mill. We think it useful
as an equivalent to the German word Begriff,
which sense Sir &quot;YV. Hamilton has in view
when he introduces it, though he does not
always adhere to his profession. And when
Mr Mill says (p. 331)
I consider it nothing less than a misfortune,
that the words Concept, General Xotion, or any
other phrase to express the supposed mental modi
fication corresponding to a general name, should
ever have been invented,
we dissent from his opinion. To talk of the
Concept of an individual/ however, as Mr
Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is improper and
inconsistent with the purpose for which the
name is given.
We are more fully in harmony with Mr
Mill in his two next chapters (xviii. et seq.) on80 The Philosophy of
Judgment and Reasoning ; which are among
the best chapters in this volume. He there
combats and overthrows the theory of Reason
ing laid down by Sir &quot;W. Hamilton
; but we
doubt the propriety of his calling this the
Conceptualist theory (pp. 367, 368) ; since
it has nothing to do with Conceptualism, in the
special sense of antithesis to Realism and
Nominalism, but is, in fact, the theory of the
Syllogism as given in the Analytics of
Aristotle, and generally admitted since. Not
merely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill s
own language, p. 366) nearly all the writers
on logic, taught a theory of the science too
small and narrow to contain their own facts.
Such, indeed, was the theory constantly taught
until the publication of Mr Mill s System of
Logic ; the first two books of which corrected
it, by arguments which are reinforced and
amplified in these two chapters on Judgment
and Reasoning, as well as in the two chapters
next following chaps, xx. and xxi.
( IsSir W. Hamilton. 81
Logic the Science of the Forms of Thought
On the Fundamental Laws of Thought. )
The contrast which is there presented, in
many different ways, between the limited
theory of logic taught by Sir W. Hamilton
and Mr Mansel, and the enlarged theory of
Mr Mill, is instructive in a high degree. We
consider Mr Mill as the real preserver of all
that is valuable in Formal Logic, from the
unfortunate consequences of an erroneous
estimate, brought upon it through the exag
gerated pretensions of logicians. When Sir
W. Hamilton contrasts it pointedly with
physical science (of which he talks with a sort
of supercilious condescension, in one of the
worst passages of his writings, p. 401) when
all its apparent fruits were produced in the
shape of ingenious but barren verbal techni
calities what hope could be entertained that
Formal Logic could hold its ground in the
estimation of the recent generation of scientific
men ? Mr Mill has divested it of that assumed
682 The Philosophy of
demonstrative authority which Bacon called
regere res per syllogismum ; but he has at
the same time given to it a firm root amidst
the generalities of objective science. He has
shown that in the great problem of Evidence
or Proof, the Laws of Formal Logic, though
bearing only on one part of the entire
procedure, yet bear upon one essential part,
proper to be studied separately
: and that the
maintenance of consistency between our affirm
ations (which is the only special province of
Formal Logic), has great importance and value
as a part of the process necessary for ascertain
ing and vindicating their truth, or exposing
their character when false or uncertified but
no importance or value except as a part of that
larger exigency.
While Mr Mill was amending the Syllo
gistic theory so as to ensure for Formal Logic its
legitimate place among the essentials of scien
tific procedure, Sir W. Hamilton was at the
same time enlarging it on its technical side, inSir W. Hamilton. 83
two modes which, are highly esteemed both by
himself and by others : 1. The recognition of
two kinds of Syllogisms ; one in Extension, the
other in Comprehension
: 2. The doctrine of
the Quantification ofthe Predicate. Both these
novelties are here criticised by Mr Mill in
chapter xxii., which we recommend the reader
to peruse conjointly with Lectures 15 and 16
of Sir W. Hamilton on Logic.
Now whereas the main objection, by which
the study of the syllogistic logic has been
weighed down and discredited in modern
times, is this, that it encumbers the memory
with formal distinctions, having no useful
application to the real process and purposes of
reasoning the procedure of Sir &quot;W. Hamilton
might almost lead us to imagine that he him
self was trying to aggravate that objection to
the uttermost. He introduces a variety of new
canons (classifying Syllogisms as Extensive
and Intensive, by a distinction founded on the
double quantity of notions, in Extension and in84 The Philosophy of
Comprehension) which he intimates that all
former logicians have neglected while it
plainly appears, even on his own showing, that
the difference between syllogisms, in respect to
these two sorts of quantity, is of no practical
value
; and that we can always change a
categorical syllogism of the one quantity into
a categorical syllogism of the other, by revers
ing the order of the two premises, and by re
versing the meaning of the copula (Lect. xvi.
p. 296) ; nay, that every syllogism is already
a syllogism in both quantities (Mill, p. 431).
Against these useless ceremonial reforms of Sir
&quot;W. Hamilton, we may set the truly philoso
phical explanation here given by Mr Mill of
the meaning of propositions.
All judgments (he says p. 423), except
where both the terms are proper names, are re
ally judgments in Comprehension ; though it is
customary, and the natural tendency of the mind,
to express most of them in terms of Extension.
In other words, we never really predicate any-Sir W. Hamilton. 85
thing but attributes
; though, in the usage of lan
guage, we commonly predicate them by means of
words which are names of concrete objects
because (p. 426) we have no other convenient
and compact mode of speaking. Most attributes,
and nearly all large bundles of attributes, have no
names of their own. We can only name them by
a circumlocution. We are accustomed to speak of
attributes, not by names given to themselves, but
by means of the names which they give to the
objects they are attributes of. All our ordinary
judgments (p. 428) are in Comprehension only ;
Extension not being thought of. But we may, if
we please, make the Extension of our general
terms an express object of thought. When I
judge that all oxen ruminate, I have nothing in
my thoughts but the attributes and their co-exist
ence. But when by reflection I perceive what
the proposition implies, I remark that other
things may ruminate besides oxen, and that the
unknown multitude of things which ruminate
form a mass, with which the unknown multitude
of things having the attributes of oxen is either
identical or is wholly comprised in it. Which of
these two is the truth I may not know, and if I
did, took no notice of it when I assented to the86 The Philosophy of
proposition, all oxen ruminate
; but I perceive, on
consideration, that one or other of them must be
true. Though I had not this in my mind when I
affirmed that all oxen ruminate, I can have it now;
I can make the concrete objects denoted by each
of the two names an object of thought, as a collect
ive though indefinite aggregate ; in other words, I
can make the Extension of the names (or notions)
an object of direct consciousness. When I do
this, I perceive that this operation introduces no
new fact, but is only a different mode of contem
plating the very fact which I had previously
expressed by the words, all oxen ruminate. The
fact is the same, but the mode! of contemplating it
is different. There is thus in all Propositions a
judgment concerning attributes (called by Sir W.
Hamilton a Judgment in Comprehension) which
we make as a matter of course
; and a possible
judgment in or concerning Extension, which we
may make, and which will be true if the former is
true.
From the lucid explanation here cited (and
from a following paragraph too long to
describe, p. 433), we see that there is no realSir W. Hamilton. 87
distinction between Judgments in Compre
hension and Judgments in Extension ; that
the appearance of distinction between them
arises from the customary mode of enunciation,
which custom is here accounted for
; that the
addition to the theory of the Syllogism, for
which Sir &quot;W. Hamilton takes credit, is alike
troublesome and unprofitable.
The like may also be said about his other
innovation, the Quantification of the Predicate.
Still more extensive are the changes (as stated
by himself) which this innovation would intro
duce in the canons of Syllogism. Indeed,
when we read his language (Appendix to
Lectures on Logic, pp. 291 297) censuring
generally the prior logicians from Aristotle
downwards, and contending that more than
half the value of logic had been lost by their
manner of handling it we may appreciate the
magnitude of the reform which he believed
himself to be introducing. The larger the
reform, the more it behoved him to be sure of88 The Philosophy of
the ground on which he was proceeding. But
on this point we remark a serious deficiency.
After laying down, with appropriate emphasis,
the valuable logical postulate, to state explicitly
what is thought implicitly, on which, Sir &quot;W.
Hamilton says,
Logic ever insists, but which logicians have
never fairly obeyed it follows that logically we
ought to take into account the quantity, always
understood in thought, but usually, and for manifest
reasons, elided in expression, not only of the sub
ject, but also of the predicate, of a judgment.
( Discussions on Philos., p. 614.)
Here Sir &quot;W. Hamilton assumes that the
quantity of the predicate is always understood
in thought ; and the same assumption is often
repeated, in the Appendix to his Lectures on
Logic, p. 291 and elsewhere, as if it was alike
obvious and incontestable. ) Now it is preciselv J
on this point that issue is here taken with SirSir W. Hamilton. 89
&quot;VV. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies altogether (p.
437) that the quantity of the predicate is
always understood or present in thought, and
appeals to every reader s consciousness for an
answer :
Does lie, when he judges that all oxen rumin
ate, advert even in the minutest degree to the
question, whether there is anything else that
ruminates ? Is this consideration at all in his
thoughts, any more than any other consideration
foreign to the immediate subject ? One person
may know that there are other ruminating
animals, another may think that there are none, a
third may be without any opinion on the subject ;
but if they, all know what is meant by ruminating,
they all, when they judge that every ox ruminates,
mean precisely the same thing. The mental pro
cess they go through, as far as that one judgment
is concerned, is precisely identical
; though some of
them may go on farther, and add otherjudgments
to it.
The last sentence cited from Mr Mill90 The Philosophy of
indicates the vice of Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s pro
ceeding in quantifying the predicate, and
explains why it was that logicians before him
declined to do so. Sir &quot;W. Hamilton, in this
proceeding, insists on stating explicitly, not




adding to it something
* Among the various authorities (upon this question
of quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamil
ton in the valuable Appendix to his Lectures on Logic,
we find one (p. 311) which takes the same ground of
objection as Mr Mill, in these words : The cause why
the quantitative note is not usually joined with the
predicate, is, that there would thus be two qucesita at
once
; to wit, whether the predicate were afiirmed of the
subject, and whether it were denied of everything beside.
For when we say, all man is all rational, we judge that
all man is rational, and judge likewise that rational is
denied of everything but man. But these are, in reality,
two different queesita ; and therefore it has become usual
to state them, not in one, but in two several propositions.
And this is self-evident, seeing that a qucesitum, in itself,
asks only Does or does not this inhere in that ? and not
Does or does not this inhere in that, and at the same time
inhere in nothing else?
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else, which may, indeed, be thought conjointly,
but which more frequently is not thought at
all. He requires us to pack two distinct judg
ments into one and the same proposition
: he
interpolates the meaning of the Propositio
Conversa simpliciter into the form of the Propo
sitio Convertenda (when an universal Affirma
tive), and then claims it as a great advantage,
that the proposition thus interpolated admits
of being converted simpliciter, and not merely
The author of this just and sagacious remark much,
surpassing what the other writers quoted in the Appendix
say was a Jew who died at Perpignan in or near 1370,
named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An interesting
account of this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in
his age, will he found in a biography by Dr Joel, pub
lished at Breslau in 1802, Levi Ben Gerson als Religions
philosoph. He distinguished himself as a writer on
theology, philosophy, and astronomy ; he was one of the
successors to the free speculative vein of Maimonides,
and one of the continuators of the Arabic Aristotelian
philosophy. He both commented on and combated the
doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that he died
earlier than 1370.92 The Philosophy of
per accidens, Mr Mill is, nevertheless, of
opinion (pp. 439 443) that though the
quantified syllogism is not a true expression of
what is in thought, yet writing the predicate
with a quantification may be sometimes a real
help to the Art of Logic. We see little
advantage in providing a new complicated
form, for the purpose of expressing in one
proposition what naturally throws itself into
two, and may easily be expressed in two. If
a man is prepared to give us information on
one Qusositum, why should he be constrained
to use a mode of speech which forces on his
attention at the same time a second and dis
tinct Qusesitum so that he must either give
us information about the two at once, or con
fess himself ignorant respecting the second ?
The two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing
some other minor peculiarities (all of them
unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really unaccount
able) of Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s Formal Logic ;
and some Fallacious Modes of Thought counte-Sir W. Hamilton. 93
nanced by Sir &quot;W. Hamilton (chs. xxiii., xxiv.
pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over.
We must find space, however, for a few words
on the Freedom of the Will (ch. xxv.), which
(in Mr Mill s language, pp. 488 549), was so
fundamental with Sir W. Hamilton, that it
may be regarded as the central idea of his
system the determining cause of most of his
philosophical opinions. Prior to Sir W.
Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain
the doctrine of Free-will, others who maintain
that of Necessity
: each supporting their
respective conclusions by reasons which they
deem sufficient. Sir W. Hamilton declares
that both the one doctrine and the other are
inconceivable and incomprehensible ; yet that,
/M
by the law of Excluded Middle, one or other
of them must be true : and he decides in
favour of Free-will, of which he believes him
self to be distinctly conscious
; moreover, Free
will is essential (he thinks) to moral responsi
bility, of which also he feels himself conscious.94 The Philosophy of
He confesses himself, however, unable to
explain the possibility of Free-will; but he
maintains that the same may be said about
Necessity also. The champions of both the
two opposite doctrines are at once resistless in
attack, and impotent in defence (Hamilton s
Footnotes on Reid, p. 602.) Mr Mansel
also asserts, even more confidently than Sir &quot;W.
Hamilton, that we are directly conscious of
Free-will (p. 503).
Sir &quot;VV. Hamilton has himself given some
of the best arguments against the doctrine of
Free-will, in refutation of Reid : arguments,
some of which are here cited by Mr Mill with
praise which they well deserve (pp. 497,
498). But Mr Mill s own reasoning on the
same side is of a still higher order, enlarging
the grounds previously urged in the last book
of his System of Logic. He protests against
the term Necessity ; and discards the idea of
Necessity, if it be understood to imply any
thing more than invariability of antecedenceSir W. Hamilton. 95
and consequence. If it mean thaf, experience
proves thus much about antecedents in the
world of mind; as in the world of matter : if it
mean more, experience does not prove more,
either in the world of matter or in the world
of mind : nor have we any grounds for affirm
ing it in either (p. 501.) If it were true,
therefore, that consciousness attested Free
will, we should find the testimony of consci
ousness opposed to a full proof from experience
and induction. But does consciousness really
attest what is called Free-will? Mr Mill
analyzes the case, and declares in the nega
tive.
To be conscious of Free-will, must mean to be
conscious, before I have decided, that I am able to
decide either way ; exception may be taken in
limine to the use of the word consciousness in such
an application. Consciousness tells me what I do
or feel. But what I am able to do, is not a subject
of consciousness. Consciousness is not prophetic ;
we are conscious of what is, not of what will or96 The Philosophy of
can be. We never know that we are able to do a
thing, except from having done it, or something
similar to it. Having acted, we know, as far as
that experience reaches, how we are able to act ;
and this knowledge, when it has becomefamiliar, is
often confounded with, and called by, the name of
consciousness. But it does not derive any increase
of authority from being misnamed : its truth is
not supreme over, but depends upon, experience.
If our so-called consciousness is not borne out by
experience, it is a delusion. It has no title to
credence, but as an interpretation of experience ;
and if it is a false interpretation, it must give
way. pp. 503, 504
After this salutary and much-needed warn
ing against the confusion between conscious
ness as an infallible authority, and belief upon
experience, of which we are conscious as a
belief Mr Mill proceeds to sift the alleged
self-evident connection between Free-will and
Accountability. He shows, not merely that
there is no connection, but that there is a posi
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will is meant that a volition is not determined
by motives, but is a spontaneous mental fact,
neither having a cause, nor admitting of being
predicted. Now, the very reason for giving
notice that we intend to punish certain acts,
and for inflicting punishment if the acts be
committed, is, that we trust in the efficacy of
the threat and the punishment as deterring
motives. If the volition of agents be not
influenced by motives, the whole machinery
of law becomes unavailing, and punishment
a purposeless infliction of pain. In fact, it is
on that very ground that the madman is
exempted from punishment ; his volition being
presumed to be not capable of being acted
upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction.
The free agent, thus understood, is one who
can neither feel himself accountable, nor be
rendered accountable, to or by others. It is
only the necessary agent (the person whose
volitions are determined by motives, and, in
case of conflict, by the strongest desire or the98 The Philosophy of
strongest apprehension) that can be held re
ally accountable, or can feel himself to be so.
The true doctrine of the Causation of human
actions (says Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in oppo
sition both to pure and to modified Fatalism, that
not only our conduct, but our character, is in part
amenable to our will : that we can, by employing
the proper means, improve our character : and
that if our character is such that, while it remains
what it is, it necessitates us to do wrong it will
be just to apply motives which will necessitate us
to strive for its improvement.
&quot;We shall not
indeed do so unless we desire our improvement,
and desire it more than we dislike the means
which must be employed for the purpose.
It thus appears that of the two proposi
tions, 1, volitions are necessary, or depend on
causes
; 2, volitions are free, or do not depend
on causes neither the one nor the other is
inconceivable or incomprehensible, as Sir &quot;W.
Hamilton supposed them to be. That the first
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experience, and by that alone; just as we
learn the like in regard to the phenomena of
the material world. Indeed, the fact that
human volitions are both predictable and
modifiable, quite as much as all those physical
phenomena that depend upon a complication of
causes which is only a corollary from what
has just been said is so universally recognized
and acted upon by all men, that there would
probably be little difference of opinion about
this question, if the antithesis were not
obscured and mystified by the familiar, but
equivocal, phrases of Free-will and Necessity.
Passing over chapter xxvii., in which Mr
Mill refutes Sir W. Hamilton s opinion that
the study of mathematics is worthless, or
nearly so, as an intellectual discipline we
shall now call attention to the concluding
remarks which sum up the results of the
volume. After saying that he differs from
almost everything in Sir W. Hamilton s philo
sophy, on which he particularly valued him-100 The Philosophy of
self, or which is specially his own, Mr Mill
describes Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s general merits as
follows :
They chiefly consist in his clear and distinct
mode of bringing before the reader many of the
fundamental questions of metaphysics
: some good
specimens of psychological analysis on a small
scale ; and the many detached logical and psycho
logical truths which he has separately seized, and
which are scattered through his writings, mostly
applied to resolve some special difficulty, and
again lost sight of. I can hardly point to any
thing he has done towards helping the more
thorough understanding of the greater mental
phenomena, unless it be his theory of Attention
(including Abstraction), which seems to me the
most perfect we have
; but the subject, though a
highly important, is comparatively a simple one.
p. 547.
Agreeing in this general view of Sir &quot;VV.
Hamilton s merits, we should be disposed to
describe them in language stronger and moreSir W. Hamilton. 101
emphatic as to degree, than that which has
just been cited. But what is stated in the
pages immediately following (pp. 550, 551)
That Sir W. Hamilton s doctrines appear
to be usually taken up under the stimulus of
some special dispute, and often afterwards
forgotten ; That he did not think out sub
jects until they were thoroughly mastered, or
until consistency was attained between the
different views which the author took from
different points of observation ; That accord
ingly, his philosophy seems made up of scraps
from several conflicting metaphysical systems
All this is literally and amply borne out
by the many inconsistencies and contradic
tions which Mr Mill has brought to view in
the preceding chapters. It would appear
that the controversial disposition was power
ful with Sir &quot;W. Hamilton, and that a pre
sent impulse of that sort (as has been said
respecting Bayle, Burke, and others) not only
served to provoke new intellectual combina-102 The Philosophy of
tions in his mind, but also exercised a Leth-
scan influence in causing obliviscence of the
old. But we can hardly follow Mr Mill in
ascribing the defect to excessive absorption
of time and energy by the study of old
writers (p. 551). If this study did no
other good, it at least kept the memory in
exercise. Now, what surprises us most in
Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s inconsistencies, is the
amount of self-forgetfulness which they imply.
While the laborious erudition of Sir W.
Hamilton cannot be fairly regarded as hav
ing produced any of his intellectual defects,
it undoubtedly stamped upon him his special
title of excellence as a philosopher. This is
fully recognized by Mr Mill
; though he
treats it as belonging not so much to a
philosopher as to an historian of philosophy.
He concludes (pp. 552 554)
:
It is much to be regretted that Sir &quot;W.
Hamilton did not write the history of philosophy,Sir W. Hamilton. 103
instead of choosing, as the direct object of his
intellectual exertions, philosophy itself. He pos
sessed a knowledge of the materials such as no
one, probably for many generations, will take the
trouble of acquiring again. Independently of the
great interest and value attaching to a knowledge
of the historical development of speculation, there
is much in the old writers on philosophy, even
those of the middle ages, really worth preserving
for its scientific value. But this should be ex
tracted, and rendered into the phraseology of
modern thought, by persons as familiar with that
as with the ancient, and possessing a command
of its language
: a combination never yet so per
fectly realized as in Sir W. Hamilton. This,
which no one but himself could have done, he
has left undone, and has given us, instead, a con
tribution to mental philosophy, which has been
more than equalled by many not superior to him
in powers, and wholly destitute of erudition. Of
all persons in modern times entitled to the name
of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading
on the subject was the scantiest, in proportion
to their intellectual capacity, were Archbishop
&quot;Whately and Dr Brown. Accordingly they are
the only two of whom Sir &quot;W. Hamilton, though104 The Philosophy of
acknowledging their abilities, speaks with some
tinge of superciliousness. It cannot be denied
that both Dr Brown and Whately would have
thought and written better than they did, if they
had been better read in the writings of previous
thinkers
; but I am not afraid that posterity will
contradict me when I say, that either of them
has done far greater service to the world in the
origination and diffusion of important thought,
than Sir ~W. Hamilton with all his learning;
because, though indolent readers, they were both
of them active and fertile thinkers.
It is not that Sir W. Hamilton s erudition is
not frequently of real use to him on particular
questions of philosophy. It does him one valu
able service : it enables him to know all the
various opinions which can be held on the ques
tions he discusses, and to conceive and express
them clearly, leaving none of them out. This it
does, though even this not always ; but it does
little else, even of what might be expected from
erudition when enlightened by philosophy. He
knew, with extraordinary accuracy, the on of each
philosopher s opinions, but gave himself little
trouble about the &amp;lt;$&amp;lt;drt. With one exception, I
find no remark bearing upon that point in anySir W. Hamilton. 105
part of his writings. I imagine he would have
been much at a loss if he had been required to
draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind of
any great thinker. He never seems to look at
any opinion of a philosopher in connection with
the same philosopher s other opinions. Accord
ingly he is weak as to the mutual relations of
philosophical doctrines. One of the most strik
ing examples of this inability is in the case of
Leibnitz, &c.
Here we find in a few sentences the con
clusion which Mr Mill conceives to be estab
lished by his book. We shall state how
far we are able to concur with it. He has
brought the matter to a direct issue, by
weighing Sir &quot;W. Hamilton in the balance
against two other actual cotemporaries ; in
stead of comparing him with some unrealized
ideal found only in the fancy of critics and
reviewers.
Comparing Sir &quot;W. Hamilton with Dr
Brown, we cordially subscribe to the opinion
of Mr Mill, We think that Dr Brown has106 The Philosophy of
1 done far greater service to the world than
Sir W. Hamilton, in the origination and
diffusion of important thought. To speak
only of two chief subjects in the field of
important thought Causality and the Free
dom, of the Will we not only adopt the
conclusions of Dr Brown, but we admire
both his acuteness and his originality in vin
dicating and illustrating the first of the two,
while we dissent entirely from the views of
Sir W. Hamilton. This alone would be suffi
cient to make us approve the superiority
assigned by Mr Mill to Dr Brown. We
discover no compensating item to be placed
to the credit of Sir W. Hamilton : for the
great doctrine of the Relativity of Know
ledge, which is our chief point of philoso
phical brotherhood with him, was maintained
by Brown also.
But in regard to Dr Whately, our judg
ment is altogether different. We cannot con
sent to admit him as a superior, or even asSir W. Hamilton. 107
an equal, to Sir &quot;W. Hamilton, in the ori
gination and diffusion of important thought.
He did much service by reviving an inclina
tion and respect for Logic, and by clearing
up a part of the technical obscurity which
surrounded it : but we look upon him as an
acute and liberal-minded English theologian,
enlarging usefully, though timidly, the in
tellectual prison in which many orthodox
minds are confined rather than as a fit
aspirant to the cosmopolitan honours of phi
losophy. An active and fertile thinker, Mr
Mill calls Whately ; and such he undoubtedly
was. But such also we consider Sir &quot;W.
Hamilton to have been in a degree, at least
equal. If the sentence which we have quoted
above be intended to deny the predicate,
active and fertile thinker, of Sir W. Ham
ilton, we cannot acquiesce in it. His intel
lect appears to us thoroughly [ active and
fertile, even when we dissent from his rea
sonings nay, even in the midst of his in-108 The Philosophy of
consistencies, when a new growth of opinions
is unexpectedly pushed up on ground which
we supposed to be already pre-occupied by
another both older and different. And we
find this same judgment implied in the dis
criminating remarks upon his philosophical
procedure made by Mr Mill himself (pp.
271, 272). For example, respecting Caus
ality and the Freedom of the &quot;Will, we detect
no want of activity and fertility, though
marked evidence of other defects especially
the unconditional surrender of a powerful
mind to certain privileged inspirations, wor
shipped as necessities of thought.
While thus declaring how far we concur
in the parallel here drawn of Sir &quot;W. Hamilton
with Brown and Whately, we must at the
same time add that the comparison is taken
under circumstances unduly favourable to
these two last. There has been no exposure
of their errors and inconsistencies, equal in
penetration and completeness to the crushingSir W. Hamilton. 109
volume which Mr Mill has devoted to Sir
&quot;W. Hamilton. To make the odds fair, he
ought to furnish a similar systematic examin
ation to Brown and Whately ; enabling us
to read their works (as we now do those of Sir
W. Hamilton) with the advantage of his un
rivalled microscope, which detects the minut
est breach or incoherence in the tissue of
reasoning and of his large command of phi
losophical premisses, which brings into full
notice what the author had overlooked. Thus
alone could the competition between the three
be rendered perfectly fair.
We regret, as Mr Mill does, that Sir
W. Hamilton did not undertake the compo
sition of a history of philosophy. Neverthe
less we must confess that we should hardly
feel such regret, if we could see evidence to
warrant Mr Mill s judgment (p. 554) that
Sir &quot;YV. Hamilton was indifferent to the Stort
of a man s opinions, and that he was incom
petent to draw up an estimate of the opinions1 10 The Philosophy of
of any great thinker, &c. Such incompet
ence, if proved to be frequent and consider
able, would deprive an author of all chance
of success in writing a history of philosophy.
But the study of Sir William Hamilton s
works does not prove it to us, though Mr
Mill has convicted him of an erroneous esti
mate of Leibnitz. We say frequent and con
siderable, because no historian of philosophy
is exempt from the defect more or less
; or
rather (to pass out of the self-confidence of
the Absolute into the modesty of the Rela
tive) we seldom find any historian whose esti
mate of great philosophical thinkers does not
often differ from our own. Hence we are
glad when ample original extracts are pro
duced, enabling us to test the historian, and
judge for ourselves a practice which Sir W.
Hamilton would have required no stimulus to
enforce upon him. There ought, indeed, to
be various histories of philosophy, composed
from different points of view
; for the ablestSir W. Hamilton. Ill
historian cannot get clear of a certain exclu-
siveness belonging to himself. But, so far
as we can conjecture what Sir W. Hamilton
u oidd or could have done, we think that a
history of philosophy composed by him would
have surpassed any work of the kind in our
language.
We trust that Sir W. Hamilton s works
will long continue to be read, along with
Mr Mill s examination of them ; and we should
be glad if the works of other philosophers
could be read along with a comment of equal
acuteness and impartiality. Any point of
view which could command the adherence of
such a mind as Sir &quot;W. Hamilton s, deserves
to be fully considered. Moreover, the living
force of philosophy, as directress of human
intelligence, depends upon keeping up in each
of her devotees a full mastery of many di
vergent and opposite veins of reasoning a
knowledge, negative and affirmative, of the
full case of opponents as well as of his own.1 12 The Philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton.
It is to Philosophy alone that our allegi
ance is sworn
; and while we concur mostly
with Mr Mill s opinions, we number both him
and Sir W. Hamilton as a noble pair of bre
thren, serving alike in her train.
Amiens Hamilton ; magis amicus Mill ;
arnica ante omnes Philosophia.
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